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EMERGENT ISSUES IN THE LAW OF EMPLOYEE 
TERMINATIONS 
 
By Cass T. Casper 
 
Cass Thomas Casper is a labor and employment law attorney at Disparti Law Group, P.A., in Chicago, 
Ill. He graduated from Chicago-Kent College of Law in May 2010 with a Certificate in Labor and 
Employment Law and was admitted to the Illinois Bar in November 2010. His practice focuses on 
employee representation in public employment civil rights, discrimination, civil service commission 
defense, administrative review, whistleblower protections, and retaliatory discharge. The opinions 
expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent legal advice, do not constitute an 






Employees facing termination often have little recourse under the law, where more often 
than not the “employment at will” doctrine rules the industrial death penalty: any 
reason, no reason, a good reason, a bad reason, a mistaken reason, just not a reason 
made illegal by certain federal, state, or local laws, or in violation of a contract. But even 
in contract-based terminations, employees challenging a firing often face an 
administrative nightmare that not only will require substantial time, but is often beset 
with confusing procedural requirements. For example, one of the most common 
challenges to terminations arises under collective bargaining agreements where a 
unionized worker pursues a grievance through the union contract claiming that a 
termination lacks “just cause”—a concept written about enough to fill a library. Some 
other industries, union and non-union ones, have other avenues to challenge 
terminations. For example, in police, fire, and corrections, police and fire commissions 
exist in many localities across the country for these employees to either challenge their 
firings, or that require the employer to gain approval from such commissions before 
going through with a termination. In teaching, tenured teachers often have 
administrative rights under union contracts and/or through local labor boards to 
challenge their terminations. In the airline industry, some flight attendants have special 
arbitration rights apart from their unions under the Railway Labor Act, for example. By 
and large, while many industries lack recourse for employees facing terminations, there 
are many that have a contractual or legal method for such challenges. 
 
The administrative process for the latter category of workers is the focus of this article. 
There have been several recent developments in Illinois administrative law that are easy 
to miss but may have momentous consequences if they are. These can provide 
ammunition for the employee attorney challenging a termination and red flags for the 
employer attorney advising on or defending a termination. Non-attorneys, including 
managers, human resource personnel, and union representatives must also be attuned 
to these concerns. 
  
This article discusses some competing administrative processes that exist to challenge 
terminations in certain industries, focusing on the sources of such procedures, what the 
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procedures consists of, and how the processes differ. It then discusses emergent issues 
that have become the central focus of arguments in Illinois state and federal courts, to 
wit, (1) challenges to an agency’s composition and consequences of an improperly 
constituted agency, (2) administrative due process principles applicable to 
administrative agency process, (3) Open Meetings Act challenges to agency procedures, 
(4) the interaction between discrimination and constitutional challenges to terminations 
and administrative agency process, and, (5) challenges to attorney representation at 
administrative agencies, and the consequences. Finally, this article concludes with some 
generalized practice pointers for all labor and employment practitioners on both sides of 
the aisle that will help clients raise challenges, help employers defend against 
challenges, and help agency attorneys better understand the agency’s operation. 
  
II. Challenging a Termination Through a Civil Service Commission 
 
Illinois is an “at will” employment state. This means that an employer may terminate an 
employee at any time for any reason or for no reason whatsoever. As the Illinois 
Supreme Court acknowledged in Palmateer v. International Harvester Company, the 
“at-will employment” rule “is a harsh outgrowth of the notion of reciprocal rights and 
obligations in employment relationships that if the employee can end his employment at 
any time under any condition, then the employer should have the same right.” 1The rule 
traces back centuries, with one nineteenth-century court colorfully describing the 
doctrine as follows, according to Palmateer: 
 
“May I not refuse to trade with anyone? May I not forbid my 
family to trade with anyone? May I not dismiss my domestic 
servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I forbid? And if my 
domestic, why not my farm-hand, or my mechanic, or 
teamster? 
 
* * * 
 
All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, 
for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, 
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.”2 
 
As harsh as the rule is, it is the nearly universal law in the United States, with only 
Montana having modified it via a statute known as the Wrongful Discharge from 
Employment Act.3 
 
There are exceptions to at-will employment, however. They arise from express or 
implied employee-employer contractual relationships, from judicial interpretation, from 
collective bargaining agreements, and from state and federal laws. In the public sector, 
constitutional avenues sometimes exist to challenge a termination, as well as, in some 
public industries, civil service commissions. The latter will be the primary focus of this 
article, following a brief discussion distinguishing the civil service commission processes 
from another familiar mode of challenging terminations: grievance arbitration. 
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As a general matter, civil service commission procedures and grievance arbitration are 
mutually exclusive. Whether one or the other is available to challenge a termination 
depends upon the employee’s specific industry and whether or not the employees are 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
 
If unionized, and with union consent, the employee more often than not will have the 
opportunity to pursue a grievance over the termination to private arbitration before a 
neutral third-party arbitrator. These private arbitrations decide whether the employee 
was terminated for “just cause” and, if not, what the remedy should be. Generally, the 
employer and the union will meet before the arbitrator for an evidentiary hearing where 
witnesses are called, documents entered into the record, and arguments made. Either 
that day, or at a later date, an arbitrator will issue a decision either granting the 
grievance, denying the grievance, or granting the grievance in part. Articles on the 
meaning of “just cause” in the union arbitration process are legion, with perhaps the 
most classic formulation being that articulated by Arbitrator Carroll R. Daugherty in 
Enterprise Wire Co. and Enterprise Independent Union, in which he laid out seven 
different questions that theoretically must each be answered “yes” for a termination to 
be for just cause.4 
 
Civil service commissions, sometimes called merit commissions or boards, are an 
alternative forum for challenging a termination in certain industries. Police, fire, and 
corrections are among the most common industries where terminations may be 
challenged in such a forum, although many public sector employees may have access to 
such a forum through a municipal ordinance, especially where they are not unionized. 
Local municipal ordinances should always be consulted for the availability of a civil 
service forum or personnel board that may hear termination challenges. For example, 
the City of Chicago has a Human Resources Board that, with some exceptions, will hear 
all termination challenges brought by City employees within every sector.5 The general 
format and scope of a civil service commission hearing will be defined by the 
empowering statute or ordinance, as well as any administrative rules promulgated by 
the particular agency. Accordingly, discovery rights, subpoena powers, and hearing 
parameters will vary agency-to-agency. As a general proposition, these administrative 
processes are not as expansive in scope as a trial in court, with discovery often being 
limited or, on rare occasions, nonexistent. 
 
One big difference between private arbitration and civil service commission procedures 
is appellate rights. Private arbitration decisions under collective bargaining agreements 
have an extremely limited set of bases for judicial review that are, indeed, so narrow that 
they are probably the most narrow and deferential forms of review in the entire field of 
law.6 
 
Decisions from civil service commissions, however, are usually reviewed either under 
Illinois’s Administrative Review Law (“ARL”),7 or, where the agency does not adopt that 
mode of review in its empowering law or agency rules, via a common law action for writ 
of certiorari.8 Whether an appeal from a civil service board’s decision on a termination is 
brought under the ARL or a writ of certiorari, the review standards are essentially the 
same.9 Under both modes of review, the court reviews the agency’s findings of fact using 
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either a clearly erroneous standard for mixed questions of fact and law, or a manifest 
weight of the evidence standard for pure questions of fact.10 However, an action for writ 
of certiorari may generally be brought within six-months of the decision, subject to 
possible equitable or other tolling,11 whereas an ARL case must be filed within thirty-five 
calendar days from the date the agency’s decision is mailed.12 
 
This article focuses on the more expansive review procedure available for civil service 
commission hearings, whether via the ARL or writ of certiorari. This article will focus on 
five emergent issues relating to civil service commission hearings that the cautious 
practitioner should be aware of and use where it is in the best interest of the client. It 
should be noted that, while many of these issues are litigated during the review process, 
the prudent practitioner will raise all these issues at the earliest possible moment before 
the agency itself, in order to head off potential waiver arguments later. The issues are: 
(1) challenges to an agency’s composition and consequences of an improperly 
constituted agency, (2) administrative due process principles applicable to 
administrative agency process, (3) Open Meetings Act challenges to agency procedures, 
(4) the interaction between discrimination and constitutional challenges to terminations 
and an administrative agency process, and (5) challenges to attorney representation at 
administrative agencies, and the consequences. 
  
III.  Emergent Issues in Administrative Law 
 
A.  Challenging an Agency’s Composition: What Is It, How to Do It, 
and Is It Wise to Do It? 
 
The first emergent issue every practitioner and agency should assess is whether there is 
a legitimate means to challenge the composition of the administrative agency before 
which a termination hearing is brought. The threshold practice question should be 
whether it is wise to do this, and the answer depends on the posture of the case. If the 
employee has already been fired, and it is the employee who initiated the appeal before 
the commission to obtain review of the termination, it is probably unwise to raise this 
issue at all: the employee would be challenging the composition of the forum the 
employee availed himself of, and the challenge is perverse in this context. For example, 
the City of Chicago’s Human Resources Board reviews termination decisions that have 
already occurred and puts the onus of the appeal on the terminated employee.13 This is 
not to say that the challenge should never be made in this context; if, for example, some 
kind of gross problem with the hearing process develops such that the employee appears 
unlikely to have a fair hearing, the employee’s representative might consider raising this 
issue to preserve it for appeal. The upshot is that, in this circumstance, prudence and 
due consideration of the complete circumstances of the hearing should guide whether to 
raise the challenge or not. 
 
A more sensible place to raise the composition challenge is where the employer must 
obtain agency approval before terminating an employee. This is the usual course of 
action for sheriff and police agencies in Illinois. The Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 
for example, which oversees termination procedures for Cook County Correctional 
Officers and Sheriff’s Police, requires the Sheriff to file written charges seeking an 
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officer’s termination, and requires the Board’s approval for the termination following a 
hearing.14 Most county sheriffs and municipal police agencies in Illinois follow the same 
kind of procedure, that is, the county sheriff or chief of police must seek approval from a 
sheriff or police board to terminate an officer.15 The City of Chicago’s Police Board also 
follows such a procedure.16 
 
But what is the challenge to an agency’s composition? In a nutshell, it is a claim that the 
agency itself is improperly composed vis-à-vis the plain language of its empowering 
statute or ordinance. This stems from the age-old, bedrock principle of agency law that 
agencies are creatures of statute and, therefore, are only empowered to act in 
accordance with the express, positive language of that statute or ordinance.17 Because of 
that bedrock principle of agency law, agency action taken outside the scope of its 
empowering statute may be “void,” meaning without legal effect and a nullity. In 
Daniels v. Industrial Commission, for example, in a complex plurality opinion, the 
Illinois Supreme Court considered a situation where the Industrial Commission’s 
chairperson appointed acting commissioners on the Commission panel that reviewed 
the employee’s worker’s compensation claim, even though the Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Act specified that only the Governor could make such appointments with 
consent of the Senate.18 Considering that the panel appointments were not done as 
required by the statute, the plurality in Daniels found that the Industrial Commission’s 
decision on Daniels’ claim lacked statutory authority and was, accordingly, void.19 
Because of this issue, the Daniels Court vacated the Commission’s decision and 
remanded the case to the Commission for a decision by a “legally constituted panel.”20 
 
If the Daniels decision seems like a surprising result, keep in mind that it is far from the 
first case in Illinois to have so ruled in the face of extra-statutory agency action.21 
 
So how does this challenge work in the sheriff and police disciplinary agency context? 
Justice McMorrow laid out, perhaps, most clearly how this challenge works in her 
special concurrence in Daniels: 
 
It is true that, as a general proposition, issues not raised 
before an administrative agency will be deemed “waived” for 
purposes of review. Voidness, however, is a fundamental 
defect that cannot be waived by a failure to object. Whether 
there is a lack of jurisdiction which renders a judgment void is 
a matter which can be raised at any time (City of Chicago v. 
Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill.2d 108, 112, 2 
Ill.Dec. 711, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976)), either on direct review 
or collaterally, as in Newkirk. Thus, Daniels' argument that 
the Industrial Commission's decision is void must be 
addressed. Here, as in Newkirk, it is only after this court 
determines whether the appointments constituted error that 
this court can consider whether the error is serious enough 
to constitute a jurisdictional defect. In other words, this court 
can make no reasoned decision on Daniels' voidness claim 
unless this court first determines whether there was error in 
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the appointment procedures followed and whether the error 
was of such a nature that it affected the Commission's 
jurisdiction.22 
 
In essence, Justice McMorrow suggests a two-step analysis for these challenges: first, 
are the appointments to the agency strictly in compliance with the statute’s 
compositional provisions and, second, if not, are the agency’s defects serious enough to 
matter, that is, serious enough to create a good faith argument that the agency has lost 
jurisdiction over the employee’s case? If the answer to both questions is “yes” on a good 
faith basis, the cautious practitioner should raise this challenge to preserve it at the 
earliest possible moment in the agency’s proceedings. But what if the agency ignores the 
issue even after it is raised before it? Such an issue was recently addressed in a wide-
ranging decision from the Illinois Supreme Court just this past year. 
 
In October 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a ruling in Goral v. Dart23 that 
should serve to remind all parties to examine cautiously an agency’s composition during 
proceedings before the agency. For employee-side practitioners, the lesson to be drawn 
is to ensure that an agency is properly composed in accordance with its empowering 
statute, and to raise objections before the agency during proceedings in order to 
preserve such objections. For employer-side practitioners and for agencies, the 
takeaway should be to carefully monitor an agency’s appointment and reappointment 
procedures to ensure strict compliance with the compositional provisions in an 
empowering statute. Failure to do so can have far-reaching and costly consequences for 
all parties. 
 
In Goral, six plaintiff correctional officers with pending termination cases before the 
Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board (“Board”) brought a pre-hearing judicial challenge to 
the composition of the Board alleging, inter alia, that the Board’s members were not 
seated for six-year terms, were not properly staggered, and had too few members for a 
certain period of time, as called for the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board Act.24 
Importantly, the plaintiffs had all filed motions to dismiss on these grounds before the 
Board in the proceedings there, which the Board did not address because such motions 
were not authorized in its administrative rules.25 As the Board would not address the 
issues, plaintiffs filed a judicial action using, inter alia, injunctive and declaratory 
judgment theories to support their claims, and sought to enjoin the Board from hearing 
their cases given the compositional defects.26 The Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, reasoning that the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies 
prevented them from pursuing their claims until the Board had issued final decisions 
that would ultimately be subject to the administrative review law.27 
 
The First District Appellate Court reversed and reinstated the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
reasoning that the authority to act and futility exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine 
applied.28 The Appellate Court also held that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek back pay 
in the Circuit Court action on the theory that they had been illegally suspended during 
proceedings before an improperly constituted Board.29 The Appellate Court stopped 
short of ruling on the merits of such claim, but reasoned that the “salient point is that 
the claim for back pay is based, in more ways than one, on the Board’s or the Sheriff’s 
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statutory authority (or lack thereof) to act, and thus this claim is excepted from the 
exhaustion doctrine.”30 This particular ruling, because it involved six plaintiffs and there 
were dozens of similarly situated employees with cases pending before the Board, 
carried significant potential for six-figure back pay awards for suspended officers with 
pending cases before the Board. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the Sheriff’s 
petition for leave to appeal on September 25, 2019.31 
 
In a split decision,32 the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the First District Appellate 
Court that, despite the usual exhaustion requirement, plaintiffs could bring a suit 
challenging the authority of the Board to act where they alleged compositional defects, 
even before the Board had rendered a final decision. The court reasoned that because 
“plaintiffs challenged the Merit Board’s composition,” which was an attack on the 
Board’s “jurisdiction to conduct proceedings against them,” the plaintiffs’ claims fell 
within the authority to act exception to the exhaustion rule 33 In addition, the Illinois 
Supreme Court based its ruling on the ground that no agency expertise was involved in 
the determination of proper appointments to the Board because the Act did not vest the 
Board with the authority to appoint its own members.34 The court, therefore, rejected 
the argument that the Board first needed to render a decision on this issue as a matter of 
agency expertise, before a court may examine it.35 
 
The court next addressed the argument that allowing a pre-decision challenge as that 
raised by the plaintiffs would cause chaos and undermine judicial economy.36 In 
rejecting this, the court reasoned that “the height of inefficiency and waste is to allow 
the proceedings to continue before an administrative tribunal that is being challenged as 
illegally comprised” and that conducting a hearing in such circumstances would be an 
“exercise in futility, where the circuit court would have to undo all those proceedings 
because the Merit Board lacked the inherent power to make or enter” the final 
decision.37 This is due to the long recognized rule from cases such as Business & 
Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Commission,38 that an 
agency exceeds its jurisdiction and renders a void order when it lacks statutory 
authorization to issue it. 
 
Finally, the Illinois high court agreed with the Appellate Court that plaintiffs could seek 
back pay without exhausting their remedies before the Board because the predominant 
questions were legal ones involving the Board’s authority to act, and nothing in the 
Board’s empowering statute vested it with expertise to determine back pay.39 
 
While still playing out in the courts, Goral and its forebears, such as Daniels and 
Vuagniaux v. Department of Professional Regulation, demonstrate the power of these 
kinds of challenges: not only are they viable in Illinois, but employees may raise these 
challenges in court where the issues are raised before the agency but left, arguably, 
unaddressed by it. Back pay, too, may be sought where an employee is suspended 
without pay before an agency with compositional issues. While the final word has not 
been written on the outcome of these challenges, the overwhelming lesson that should 
be learned on all sides of the aisle is to analyze the agency itself to make sure it is 
properly constituted. Not doing so not only can hurt an employee’s voidness claim 
should it arise, but it can jeopardize an employer’s termination efforts and the validity of 
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the agency’s actions. 
 
B. Challenging Administrative Due Process: Agency Review and Timeliness 
 
Probably among the most confusing and difficult concepts in all public sector 
employment law is “due process.” But forget the procedural and substantive due process 
distinction for purposes of this section of this article. Instead, simply focus on a novel 
approach to examining the manner whereby the agency rendered a decision. Properly 
examined, a particular hearing process may be rife with means to challenge an agency 
decision as failing administrative due process standards. Conversely, employers and 
agencies should be aware of these pitfalls to be able to defend decisions. 
 
Administrative due process analysis starts with the premise that “[a] reviewing court 
may inquire into the method used by an agency to achieve the result at issue.”40 
“Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it contravenes the legislature's intent, fails 
to consider a crucial aspect of the problem, or offers an explanation so implausible that 
it runs contrary to agency expertise.”41 
 
A common administrative procedure is for a board or commission to have a single 
member, or even a non-member hearing officer, preside at the hearing, with all board or 
commission members making the decision based on the record developed in the 
hearing. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation42is a key 
starting point for analyzing the administrative due process requirements applicable in 
such situations. The Illinois Supreme Court in Abrahamson recognized: 
 
It is settled that, absent express statutory language to the 
contrary, agency members making the final decision need not 
be present when the evidence is taken, so long as they review 
the record of proceedings. (Homefinders, Inc. v. City of 
Evanston (1976), 65 Ill.2d 115, 128, 2 Ill.Dec. 565, 357 N.E.2d 
785.) *** The court has specifically held that it is sufficient if 
even only one Board member listened to the live testimony. 
Procedural due process is afforded where the absent Board 
members reviewed the transcript before making findings and 
recommendations. (Bruns v. Department of Registration & 
Education (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 872, 875–76, 17 Ill.Dec. 189, 
376 N.E.2d 82.) In the present case, the Board stated in its 
recommended findings that it reviewed the transcripts of all 
of the hearings, in addition to the other evidence. We hold that 
Abrahamson was afforded due process of law.43 
 
The court in Bruns v. Department of Registration & Education similarly stated: “The 
requirements of due process are met if the decision-making board considers the 
evidence contained in the report of proceedings before the hearing officer and bases its 
determination thereon.”44 In Bruns, the court held that procedural due process was 
afforded where six members of the Board reviewed the transcript before making its 
findings and recommendations.”45 




In Kafin v. Division of Professional Regulation, the court also found that administrative 
due process was met despite the absence of the board members from the administrative 
hearing, but emphasized that “the record shows the Board members reviewed the 
transcript of plaintiff’s administrative hearing before making their recommendation to 
the Director.”46 The court expounded on this requirement: 
 
It is well settled that a board may “hear” evidence as provided 
in section 37 by reviewing the transcript of proceedings 
presided over by a hearing officer. See Morgan v. United 
States, 298 U.S. 468, 481–82, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 1288 
(1936) (discussing what it means for administrative 
decisionmakers to “hear” evidence); Homefinders, Inc. v. City 
of Evanston, 65 Ill.2d 115, 128, 2 Ill.Dec. 565, 357 N.E.2d 785 
(1976) ( “[t]he requirements of due process are met if the 
decision-making board considers the evidence contained in 
the report of proceedings before the hearing officer and bases 
its determinations thereon”); Bruns v. Department of 
Registration & Education, 59 Ill.App.3d 872, 875, 17 Ill.Dec. 
189, 376 N.E.2d 82 (1978) (“members of a board charged with 
ultimate decision-making authority need not personally hear 
the evidence in order for their determination to be 
valid”); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Pollution Control 
Board,20 Ill.App.3d 301, 310–11, 314 N.E.2d 350 (1974) (due 
process satisfied where the Pollution Control Board 
considered and appraised the evidence, regardless of whether 
any board members personally heard testimony).47 
 
The court in Homefinders, Inc. v. City of Evanston makes the same point: 
 
The requirements of due process are met if the decision-
making board considers the evidence contained in the report 
of proceedings before the hearing officer and bases its 
determinations thereon. (Morgan; Anniston Manufacturing 
Co.; Estate of Varian; Stocker Mfg. Co.; see also 2 Davis, 
Administrative Law (treatise) s 11.02 (1958); 2 Am.Jur.2d 
Administrative Law sec. 437 (1962).) A substantial majority 
of State courts which have considered the question have come 
to the same conclusion. (E.g., Bertch v. Social Welfare 
Department (1955), 45 Cal.2d 524, 289 P.2d 485; City of 
Derby v. Water Resources Com. (1961), 148 Conn. 584, 172 
A.2d 907; Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Com. (1967), 260 
Iowa 1115, 152 N.W.2d 248; Clairborne v. Coffeyville 
Memorial Hospital (1973), 212 Kan. 315, 510 P.2d 
1200; Younkin v. Boltz (1966), 241 Md. 339, 216 A.2d 714; 
Napuche v. Liquor Control Com. (1953), 336 Mich. 398, 58 
N.W.2d 118; Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of 
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Pennsylvania Department of Highways (1960), 400 Pa. 584, 
163 A.2d 80; Tecumseh Products Co. v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board (1964), 23 Wis.2d 118, 126 
N.W.2d 520; contra, McAlpine v. Garfield Water Com. 
(1947), 135 N.J.L. 497, 52 A.2d 759.) We are in accord with the 
majority view and conclude that the requirements of 
procedural due process would be met under the Evanston Fair 
Housing Ordinance if those members who were not 
personally present at the hearings base their determination of 
penalties on the evidence contained in the transcript of such 
proceedings.48 
 
The upshot of these standards is this: while it is true that an agency may assign one 
member to oversee the hearing process, administrative due process still requires that 
the full agency—every member—conduct some level of review of all the evidence, 
documents, recordings, and testimony that occurred at the hearing. The foregoing cases 
suggest that not doing this could amount to an administrative due process violation. 
Consequently, some investigation and analysis should be done of the agency’s 
deliberative process to understand if administrative due process has been satisfied. 
 
So what should the Court do if there is such an administrative due process violation? 
The court might remand to the agency for further consideration, but there is some case 
law that seems to require outright reversal, rather than a remand to the agency.49 These 
decisions all provide some legal basis to pursue a more extensive remedy than a remand 
in the face of an administrative due process violation. 
 
There is another way to head off a remand order from the court, and another dimension 
to administrative due process: a remand will result in an untimely final agency decision. 
Take the hypothetical timeline of a given case: 
 
1. Employee suspension without pay pending 
an agency hearing 
July 16, 2018 
2. Agency hearing January 9, 2019 
3. Agency decision April 26, 2019  
4. If remanded, agency final decision Some months/years 
following April 26, 2019 
 
Given that administrative review actions may take months to years, the above timeline 
likely runs the proceedings into a timeliness problem per that identified in Magett v. 
Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board50 and Stull v. Dep't of Children Family Services51,  
where the courts found that the time between a hearing and a decision had violated due 
process. In essence, the employee’s argument should be that a remand to address 
administrative due process violations will result in an agency final decision that is not 
timely, also as a violation of administrative due process. 
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The Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board Act, like some other empowering statutes and 
ordinances for civil service commissions, imposes a 120-day requirement on decisions, 
stating that, “[t]he Board shall render its decision no later than 120 days following the 
conclusion of any hearings conducted under this Section.”52 The Stull Court found a 
similar time requirement, even if interpreted to be directory rather than mandatory, 
reflected the judgment of the legislature as to what is a reasonable time within which an 
agency must act, stating: 
 
We find no cases which address whether the time limit set 
forth in section 7.12 of the Act within which DCFS must 
complete its investigation is mandatory or directory. 
However, whether deemed to be mandatory or directory, the 
time limitations set forth in the Act and administrative rules 
at the very least reflect the judgment of the legislature and the 
agency as to what constitutes a reasonable length of time in 
which the agency must act. We think it follows that a gross 
deviation from those time limitations would be deemed to be 
unreasonable and contrary to the legislative intent, evidenced 
by the setting of time limitations, that the agency act in a 
reasonably timely manner.53 
 
In Stull, the court found that a final decision not being rendered until 456 days after an 
appeal began, in the presence of an administrative rule requiring one within 90 days 
(even though directory) was “unreasonable and served to deprive Stull of his 
constitutional right to due process.”54 
 
Accordingly, for the employment practitioner, any attack on administrative due process 
should examine whether there is corollary attack on the timeliness of a final agency 
decision. For the employer-side and agency practitioner, best practices should involve 
encouraging and ensuring that the entire agency conducts a thorough review of the 
record of proceedings, keeps careful records of what it reviewed, and ensuring that 
decisions are issued as swiftly as practicable. 
 
C. The Open Meetings Act’s Application to Civil Service Commissions 
 
Another consideration for civil service commission practice is the application of the 
Open Meetings Act (OMA), how the agency came to a decision, whether there was an 
open or closed meeting on the final vote on the decision, and what procedure was used 
to circulate and sign any final written decision. While courts continue to address the 
available remedies for Open Meetings Act violations, it is certainly established that a 
violation results in a decision being non-final. For the reasons noted on timeliness in the 
prior section, there is a significant argument that an Open Meetings Act violation will 
result in a non-final decision that is now so untimely as to violate administrative due 
process. 
 
Courts have interpreted the OMA as requiring that public bodies such as civil service 
commissions take all final actions in open meetings.55 Deliberations on an employee’s 
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case may occur in a closed meeting; however, the final vote on such case must be taken 
in an open meeting.56 
 
In addition, a final decision cannot simply be signed by all Board members without a 
meeting, because such constitutes a final action being taken, essentially, in secrecy, like 
at a closed meeting.57 Another pertinent case is Howe v. Retirement Board of the 
Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, in which the Court held that “[i]n light 
of the requirement of section 1 of the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1 (West 2010)) 
that public bodies vote openly, the Board’s argument that the signatures of Board 
members in its written decision denying [an application] suffices hardly holds water. No 
public body in Illinois subject to the Open Meetings Act can take final action by merely 
circulating some document for signature and not voting on it publicly.”58 In 
Baldermann v. Board. of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the Village of Chicago 
Ridge, the court explained a pitfall that may result in an OMA violation: 
 
[T]he Board's conduct in circulating a written decision for 
signature after the hearing runs afoul of the Open Meetings 
Act. As we emphasized in Howe, the written decision of a 
public body must be prepared and provided to each board 
member in advance of a board vote finally disposing of the 
matter under consideration. Howe, 2013 IL App (1st) 122446, 
¶ 25, 374 Ill.Dec. 969, 996 N.E.2d 664. This comports with the 
requirement of a public vote under the Open Meetings Act. 
See 5 ILCS 120/1. 02 (West 2010). “No public body in Illinois 
subject to the Open Meetings Act can take final action by 
merely circulating some document for signature and not 
voting on it publicly.” Howe, 2013 IL App (1st) 122446, ¶ 26, 
374 Ill.Dec. 969, 996 N.E.2d 664. Here, if the signatures of the 
Board trustees on the written decision were meant to signify 
their adoption of the decision's findings, that “vote” was just 
as “secret” as the vote that prompted this court 
in Lawrence to find the lack of any valid final order. 
See Lawrence, 2013 IL App (1st) 130757, ¶¶ 21, 23, 370 
Ill.Dec. 683, 988 N.E.2d 1039 59 
 
The downside of Open Meetings Act claims in the civil service context is that the 
Act has limited remedies.60 While the Act provides for attorney’s fees and costs, 
the substantive remedies are largely injunctive in nature and directed toward 
ensuring that meetings are open. There is a provision allowing a court to declare 
null and void any “final action taken at a closed meeting in violation of this Act”; 
however, Courts in Illinois have been largely hesitant to exercise this remedy.61 
Compensatory and punitive damages, so far, have been found unavailable under 
the Act.62 
 
Notwithstanding the limitations on remedies in the Open Meetings Act, the 
courts’ recognition that actions taken in violation of it are non-final creates a 
linkage between the Act and the administrative due process standards set forth 
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above. The cautious practitioner should argue that the non-final nature of an 
action taken in violation of the Act now renders any attempt to take final action 
untimely as a matter of administrative due process. It remains to be seen if any 
court will accept such an argument, but the present point is for practitioners not 
to overlook the reciprocal relationship between the Open Meetings Act and 
administrative due process. 
 
D. The Interplay of Discrimination and Constitutional Claims and Civil 
Service Commission Hearings 
 
There is perhaps no more confusing issue for the employee-side practitioner than what 
to do when your client has a potential legal cause of action for the termination, such as 
discrimination, a constitutional claim such as a First Amendment violation, or a 
whistleblower claim. Do you raise this issue at the civil service commission hearing or 
not? The short answer is that it depends, but you may have a major collateral estoppel 
problem or face the Rooker-Feldman doctrine later on if you do not and then try to 
bring the claim in court. Under Rooker-Feldman, federal district courts lack subject 
matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions.63 This means that federal courts lack 
jurisdiction to hear cases that require them to review state court decisions, or to set 
aside a state court judgment. In other words, if a plaintiff has already sued over an issue 
in state court, or could have brought the issue in state court but did not, the federal 
courts will not review or set aside the state court judgment. As one federal district court 
has recognized, “[t]he doctrine is rooted in our system of federalism, which respects the 
authority of state courts to decide the cases before them.”64 The idea in layman’s terms 
is that where we have both a state and federal judicial system, courts in both systems 
ought to respect and not interfere with the decisions of the other system. 
 
But even with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine district courts may look more favorably on 
constitutional claims stemming from a termination before a civil service commission if 
the employee had tried to raise the issue before the commission but was not allowed to 
litigate it there.65 So, too, failing to raise a discrimination or other legal claim before the 
civil service commission may lead to a finding of preclusion later.66 The Seventh Circuit 
has stated that these arguments must be raised at the civil service commission: 
 
If a fired employee contends that the sheriff fired him not for 
cause but for reasons forbidden by the U.S. Constitution, 
nothing in any statute or case law of Illinois suggests that the 
Board cannot hear evidence in support of the contention, and 
the statutory language quoted above suggests it can, as 
does Green v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 87 Ill.App.3d 
183, 188, 42 Ill.Dec. 478, 482, 408 N.E.2d 1187, 1191 (1980), 
and Fox v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Ill.App.3d 381, 392, 23 
Ill.Dec. 174, 181, 383 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (1978). It seems, then, 
that the Board made a mistake of state law in refusing to 
consider the plaintiffs' constitutional claims; and for such a 
mistake the remedy is an appeal to the state courts. 67 
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Commissions, however, vary wildly on whether they will allow evidence of outside legal 
claims into the hearing. Indeed, whatever the merits of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, it 
is perhaps unfair to expect local police boards to be prepared to handle discrimination, 
Section 1983, whistleblower, retaliation, and other legal claims an employee may have. 
Nonetheless, White and cases like it do suggest that raising the issue is the most prudent 
course of action for the employee-practitioner; if the agency denies the ability to pursue 
it, at least there is a record that it was tried, which will assist with overcoming later 
preclusion and abstention arguments. 
 
E. Attorney Representation Issues at Civil Service Commission Hearings 
 
Another emergent, yet uncertain, issue is the applicability of laws regarding 
representation of government agencies before civil service commissions, and whether 
failure to follow these laws may void the proceedings. One basis for this argument is the 
Illinois Counties Code, which clearly enumerates powers and duties of county state’s 
attorneys, and suggests that they are mandated to represent sheriffs before sheriff’s 
merit commissions: 
Sec. 3-9005. Powers and duties of State’s attorney. (a) The 
duty of each State’s attorney shall be: 
(3) To commence and prosecute all actions and proceedings 
brought by any county officer in his official capacity. 
*** 
(7) To give his opinion, without fee or reward, to any county 
officer in his county, upon any question or law relating to any 
criminal or other matter, in which the people or the county 
may be concerned. 
 
There can be no question that the cases brought by sheriffs against sheriff’s officers are 
actions and proceedings brought by sheriffs in their official capacities within the scope 
of 55 ILCS § 5/3-9005(a). The plain language of the Counties Code would suggest that 
the county state’s attorneys are mandated to conduct these proceedings on behalf of 
sheriffs. But what happens if they don’t? 
 
No Illinois Appellate Court has yet addressed the applicability of the principle expressed 
by the Fifth District in People v. Ward to merit commissions. That case held that a 
proceeding conducted by an improperly appointed state’s attorney is void: 
 
If a case is not prosecuted by an attorney properly acting as an 
assistant State’s Attorney, the prosecution is void and the 
cause should be remanded so that it can be brought by a 
proper prosecutor. See, e.g., People ex rel. Livers v. Hanson, 
290 Ill. 370 (1919). In light of the language of section 4.01 of 
the Act and the absence of evidence in the record of an order 
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appointing [an attorney] as a special assistant, we agree with 
defendant that his conviction must be vacated and the cause 
remanded so that it can be brought by a proper prosecutor.68 
  
Other cases, such as People v. Woodall,69 have also recognized this principle. In People 
v. Dunson, the court held that the prosecution of a defendant by an unlicensed 
prosecutor rendered the judgment void, as a matter of common law, without the 
necessity of demonstrating that the prosecutor’s conduct had prejudiced the 
defendant.70 The court held that “the participation in the trial by a prosecuting assistant 
State’s Attorney who was not licensed to practice law under the laws of Illinois requires 
that the trial be deemed null and void ab initio and that the resulting final judgment is 
also void.”71 
 
The corporate nullity rule, while not precisely analogous, also helps shape an argument 
by emphasizing that courts have long recognized that entities must act through 
attorneys and, by implication, properly appointed ones. For example, the Illinois 
Supreme Court, in Downtown Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, collected 
Illinois cases recognizing that actions taken by a non-lawyer on behalf of a corporation 
are “a nullity and warrant dismissal, the entry of a default judgment against the 
corporation, or vacatur of any judgment rendered.”72 “The defect is deemed incurable 
and goes to the court’s power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.”73  
 
There may also be a constitutional dimension to the argument that state’s attorneys, 
properly appointed, must prosecute county civil service commission hearings on behalf 
of county officials. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized in County of 
Cook ex rel. Robert F. Rifkin et al. v. Bear Stearns & Co.: “We have stated that these 
powers and duties [in Section 3-9005] may be revised by statute. It does not follow, 
however, that the legislature can reduce a State’s Attorney’s constitutionally derived 
power to direct the legal affairs of the county.”74 Rifkin might support the proposition 
that a state’s attorney not exercising the duties laid out in the state’s attorney’s 
empowering statute is improperly delegating their constitutionally derived duties to 
other officials. No court has yet ruled on this issue. 
 
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is to direct the civil service practitioner to 
examine even the pedigree of the opponent. According to People v. Ward, an improperly 
appointed attorney at a civil service commission hearing may yet cause the proceedings 
to be found void.75 The jury is out, but the argument is there. 
 
IV. Practical Lessons from the Emergent Issues Discussed in This Article 
 
The foregoing emergent issues serve as important reminders to public sector labor 
practitioners who defend employees before agencies and civil service commissions. 
 
They present powerful tools in the employee practitioner’s arsenal, and a stern reminder 
to government lawyers representing agencies to check and double check the 
empowering statutes to ensure appointments are made in conformity to the statutes’ 
requirements, to ensure that administrative due process and the Open Meetings Act 
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requirements are being met, and to ensure that attorneys are properly appointed. A few 
additional practice pointers are worth bearing in mind: 
 
• The agency practitioner should examine an agency’s empowering statute for  
requirements about its composition to ascertain if there are defects that 
undermine its authority to act. Objections should not be limited to raising 
technical issues, but should explain why any such issues undermine the core 
foundational purposes of the statute’s compositional provisions. 
• The agency attorney should periodically review the agency’s empowering statute 
to ensure that there is strict compliance with its compositional requirements. 
• Agency members should be directed to track their appointment requirements to  
ensure they are properly appointed and reappointed in accordance with the 
statute. 
• Any defects in an agency’s composition should be objected to at the outset of  
proceedings in writing so as to preclude arguments about waiver or assent. 
• If the agency does not address the objections, a practitioner should consider 
judicial action to address the issues before the completion of the proceedings 
using the “authority to act” exception to exhaustion requirements. 
• Employee-side attorneys should examine the pedigree of their opponent to 
ensure that they are properly appointed and have legal authority to act on behalf 
of the employer. They should object to the issue as early as possible to preserve it. 
• Employer-side attorneys should make sure they have legal authority to represent 
the employer at the proceeding, and inquire about being appointed special 
assistant state’s attorney from the relevant county to allay any concerns. 
• Agency attorneys should advise the agency to make sure they are taking all final 
actions, such as votes on termination decisions, in open session, properly 
announced in accordance with the Open Meetings Act. 
• Agency attorneys should also ensure that agency members do not merely sign a 
decision, but conduct some level of review of the evidence adduced in a case, and 
keep a careful record of what was done in the decision making process. 
• Employee-side practitioners should not be afraid to examine the process used at 
hearings, or to get creative in thinking of new ways to defend clients before these 
tribunals. 
• While fact specific and case-by-case, an employee-practitioner should consider  
attempting to raise all legal claims the employee may have before the civil service 
commission in order to help overcome preclusion, estoppel, and abstention 
arguments that may later arise. 
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I. IIELR Developments 
 
A. Subject of Bargaining 
 
On April 2, 2021, Governor Pritzker signed HB 2275 into law, which repealed Section 
4.5 of the IELRA. Section 4.5 had provided that, for Chicago Public Schools, the 
following were permissive subjects of bargaining: decisions to subcontract; decisions to 
lay off or reduce force; decisions determining class size, class staffing, and assignment; 
class scheduling, academic calendar, and length of work and school day; decisions 
concerning pilot or experimental programs; and decisions to use technology to deliver 
educational programming and the staffing of such technology. These decisions will now 
be considered to be mandatory subject of bargaining to the same extent that they are 
mandatory subject for all other school districts. 
 
B. Union Dues and Exclusive Representation 
 
In Bennett v. AFSCME Council 31, 991 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2021), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the IELRA’s provisions 
for exclusive representation by the union selected by a majority of the employees in a 
bargaining unit and further held that the continued deduction of union dues from a 
union member who purported to resign her membership pursuant to the member’s 
commitment to continue paying dues until a specified two-week opt-out window did not 
violate the First Amendment to the Constitution. 
 
Bennett, a custodian for the Moline-Coal Valley School District, was in a bargaining unit 
represented by AFSCME. She opted to join the union and authorized the deduction of 
her dues from her pay, but after the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME 
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), which held that the imposition of fair share fees on 
non-members of the union whom the union represented was unconstitutional, Bennett 
resigned her membership. The union accepted her resignation and withdrawal of dues 
deduction authorization but made them effective only after the close of the annual opt-
out window period provided for in her membership agreement. 
 
Bennett argued that the IELRA’s provision making the union the exclusive 
representative of all employees in the bargaining unit violated her right to be free from 
compelled association as recognized by the Supreme Court in Janus. The Court of 
Appeals rejected Bennett’s argument, basing its decision on Minnesota State Board for 
Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), where the Supreme Court rejected 
a First Amendment challenge to a Minnesota law that provided for exclusive-bargaining 
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unit representation for purposes of meet-and-confer discussions on matters outside the 
scope of mandatory negotiations. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that public workers are 
free to join or refrain from joining a union; proof of that was Bennett’s resignation after 
the Janus ruling was issued. The court found further support for this conclusion because 
every circuit court that has addressed this issue after the Janus decision has held that 
exclusive representation remains constitutional. 
 
Bennett argued that, under Janus, her dues deduction authorization was void and no 
deductions could be made without her post-Janus affirmative consent. Bennett’s most 
recent deduction authorization provided that it would renew from year to year unless 
she revoked it in writing between ten and twenty-five days before the scheduled 
renewal. The court observed that Bennet voluntarily committed to paying her dues until 
the annual two-week opt-out period and that the membership agreement established a 
fifteen-day window in which Bennett could revoke her authorization and stop the 
withholding of union dues from her wages. 
 
The court noted that the Third and Ninth Circuits had already rejected the arguments 
raised by Bennett. Fischer v. Governor of New Jersey, 842 Fed. Appx. 741, 2021 WL 
141609 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2021); Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir.2020). In 
both cases, the circuit courts relied on the Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 
(1991), where the Court explained that "[t]he First Amendment [did] not support [the 
plaintiffs'] right to renege on their promise to join and support the union" because that 
"promise was made in the context of a contractual relationship between the union and 
its employees." Furthermore, said the Seventh Circuit, it is generally accepted that "the 
legal framework that existed at the time of a contract's execution must bear on its 
construction" and that "a subsequent change in the law cannot retrospectively alter the 
parties' agreement." Consequently, the Seventh Circuit concluded, the continued 
deduction of dues in accordance with the terms of Bennett’s dues deduction 
authorization did not violate her First Amendment rights. 
 
II.  IPLRA Developments 
 
A. Duty to Bargain 
 
In AFSCME, Council 31, and County of DuPage (DuPage Care Center), S-CA-19-116 
(ILRB State Panel Apr. 17, 2021), the State Panel overruled its prior decision in County 
of Grundy, 32 PERI ¶ 26 (ILRB State Panel 2015), and held that during the period 
between recognition of an exclusive bargaining representative and execution of a first 
contract, an employer is obligated to bargain over the imposition of discipline, 
regardless of preexisting practices, if the employer exercises discretion in disciplining 
employees. In County of Grundy, the State Panel affirmed the Executive Director’s 
dismissal of allegations that the County of Grundy had unilaterally changed a 
mandatory subject of bargaining when it terminated a probationary employee during 
negotiations for an initial collective bargaining agreement with the representative of the 
bargaining unit of which the discharged employee was a member. The State Panel found 
the discharge conformed with the County of Grundy’s preexisting, established, at-will 
personnel policy, which represented the status quo. 
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The State Panel found that the certification of the exclusive representative triggers a 
public employer’s bargaining obligations and that its decision in County of Grundy had 
failed to adequately preserve and protect the collective bargaining rights of employees 
and their exclusive representatives during that tenuous period between certification and 
execution of an initial collective bargaining agreement. The ILRB applied the principles 
articulated by the National Labor Relations Board in Total Security Management 
Illinois 1 LLC, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (2016), finding the NLRB’s reasoning furthered the 
policy of the IPLRA to extend collective bargaining rights to public employees. 
 
In Total Security Management, the NLRB overruled its decision in In Re McClatchy 
Newspapers, Inc., d/b/a The Fresno Bee, 337 NLRB 1161 (2002) (Fresno Bee), and held 
that an employer is obligated to bargain over the imposition of discipline, regardless of 
preexisting practices, if the employer exercises discretion in disciplining employees. The 
State Panel recognized that in 800 River Road Operating Company, LLC d/b/a Care 
One at New Milford, 369 NLRB No. 109 (2020) (800 River Road), the NLRB had 
changed course and overruled its decision in Total Security Management, reinstating 
its decision in Fresno Bee, no longer requiring pre-disciplinary bargaining prior to the 
execution of a collective bargaining agreement. The State Panel, however, found the 
NLRB’s analysis in Total Security Management more persuasive and consistent with 
the purposes of the Act, especially in the absence of Illinois case law directly on point. 
 
Ultimately, the State Panel found that the certification of the exclusive representative 
triggers a public employer’s bargaining obligations and its decision in County of Grundy 
had failed to adequately preserve and protect the collective bargaining rights of 
employees and their exclusive representatives during that tenuous period between 
certification and execution of an initial collective bargaining agreement.  
 
B. Representation Elections 
 
In Front Line Labor Alliance, County of Cook and Sheriff of Cook County, and 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700, L-RC-21-006 (PERI NOT 
PUBLISHED) (ILRB Local Panel Apr. 19, 2021), the Local Panel affirmed the Executive 
Director’s order that a runoff election between the Front Line Labor Alliance (FLLA) 
and the incumbent representative, Teamsters, Local 700 be conducted by mail ballot in 
the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. FFLA filed a representation petition seeking to 
replace the incumbent Local 700 as exclusive bargaining representative. Pursuant to the 
parties’ stipulation, the election was conducted by mail ballot and resulted in a runoff 
between FFRA and Local 700. Local 700 refused to stipulate to a mail ballot runoff and 
insisted on an in-person election. 
 
The ILRB’s administrative rules allow mail ballot elections upon the ILRB’s 
determination that “a mail ballot will better effectuate the purposes of the Act.” 80 Ill. 
Adm. Code § 1210.140. The Executive Director determined that due to Covid-19 social 
distancing guidelines and Covid-19-related health and safety concerns of voters and the 
ILRB conducting the election, a mail ballot would allow for a timely and safe runoff 
election, and better assist the ILRB in effectuating the purposes of the IPLRA.  
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Local 700 appealed, contending the Order contravened ILRB and NLRB policy favoring 
in-person elections and that in-person elections had been conducted at the same facility 
in 2009 and 2014, demonstrating the feasibility of holding elections in that manner. 
Local 700 alleged that the initial mail ballot election disenfranchised unit members and 
that that flaw would likely be repeated if the runoff were conducted in the same manner. 
 
The Local Panel found Local 700’s arguments were outweighed by the concerns for the 
health and safety of unit members and ILRB staff, along with the challenges posed in 
complying with Covid-19 related mitigation measures in the conduct of an election, the 
primary reasons that the Executive Director had offered in directing the runoff election 
by mail ballot. It ordered that the elections proceed by mail ballot. 
 
III. FLSA Developments 
 
In Chagoya v. City of Chicago, 992 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2021), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that time spent by members of the Chicago Police 
Department's SWAT unit transporting, loading, and unloading SWAT gear to and from 
their employer-provided vehicles and securing it inside their homes was not 
compensable under the FLSA because it was not an integral and indispensable activity 
for their jobs. 
 
The Court's observed that the FLSA applies only to the employee's "principal activity." 
An employee's "principal activity" also includes any activity "integral and indispensable" 
to the principal activity. A "principal activity" begins an employee's workday; once 
started, that "workday" continues until the conclusion of the employee's final principal 
activity of the day. The FLSA, however, does not apply to a worker's "preliminary 
activity" or "postliminary activity.” 
 
The Court focused on the differences between a "principal activity" on the one hand and 
"preliminary activity" or "postliminary activity" on the other. The court pointed out 
"that SWAT operators have been able to perform off-duty critical response efforts 
without having their gear at home, meaning that such a practice is not indispensable." 
Thus, ordinary commute times and preliminary and postliminary activities that 
occurred before or after the workday were no longer compensable activities under the 
FLSA: "[T]he fact that certain pre-shift activities are necessary for employees to engage 
in their principal activities does not mean that those pre-shift activities are integral and 
indispensable to a principal activity." 
 
The court discussed the Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 
U.S. 260, 260 (1956), where the Court held that a meatpacking worker sharpening his 
knife was an “integral and indispensable” activity because "a dull knife would slow down 
production … affect the appearance of the meat and the quality of the hides, cause waste 
and make for accidents." The Court distinguished Chagoya from Mitchell because, in 
Chagoya, the SWAT operators could perform their principal duties without bringing 
their equipment home and relying on the other arrangements.  
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The Department of Labor has also established what activity is an integral and 
indispensable one: 
 
If an employee in a chemical plant, for example, cannot 
perform his principal activities without putting on certain 
clothes, changing clothes on the employer's premises at the 
beginning and end of the workday would be an integral part 
of the employee's principal activity. On the other hand, if 
changing clothes is merely a convenience to the employee and 
not directly related to his principal activities, it would be 
considered a "preliminary" or "postliminary" activity rather 
than a principal part of the activity. 
 
The Seventh Circuit held that it is an error to focus on whether the employer required a 
particular activity to consider it "integral and indispensable." The Court clarified that 
"[t]he integral and indispensable test is tied to the productive work that the employee is 
employed to perform." Based on that approach, the Court considered that even if the 
SWAT operators were required to transport and store their equipment in their 
residences, it is not material dispute and does not prevent summary judgment since it is 
far removed from the operators' principal activity of handling critical incidents. 
 
 
